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Margolis, Joseph
(b. 1924), American philosopher of aesthetics, history, science and culture.
Methodological Overview. Margolis’ methodology is best located in the pragmatic tradition,
broadly construed. His pragmatism lies in his commitment to understanding the world as part of
collective and consensual human practice and situated interaction, his embracing of the changing
nature of history and science, and in his approach to human knowledge as constructed. In
particular this pragmatic bent is evidenced by his affinity for Charles Sanders Peirce’s
semeiotics, by which thought shows us the real world through the interpretation of signs and
symbols, and the existence of mind is legitimated as “objective” and “real.” Margolis also uses
Peirce’s theory of predicative generals (as constructed but existent place-holders that focus
discourse) in place of universals (as metaphysically fixed and existent types) as a way to discuss
the discursive and indeterminate natures of what he considers to be inherently interpretable and
significant properties of cultural artifacts (to be described more fully, below, as Intentional
properties of artworks). Margolis also agrees with John Dewey’s rejection of fixity and certainty
and with what he construes as Dewey’s “Hegelian” acceptance of the way that a culture’s
consensual life is connected to its developing history. Lastly, Margolis incorporates the later
Wittgenstein’s idea of the Lebensformen into his idea of how the enlanguaged practice and
parameters of a cultural world constrain what we can know about human culture and history and
its products. (The later Wittgenstein, in The Philosophical Investigations, is seen as pragmatic on
some accounts of pragmatism.)

In addition Margolis’ approach can be construed as pragmatic in its aim to bridge the conceptual
divide between the hermeneutic tradition of continental philosophy and the naturalist approaches
within analytic philosophy by creating a hybrid theory in which the interpretable,
historical/cultural world is both incarnate in and emergent from the natural or physical world. In
his view considering these two worlds together is not contradictory and does not involve one
supervening on or being reducible to the other. Instead these two worlds exist together in a
symbiotic hybrid of culture and nature that is perceptually discernible, self-interpreting, and
metaphysically “real.” By “perceptually discernible” he is not limiting perception to sense
impressions -- Margolis construes perception in a non-purely phenomenal, mind-involved way.
On his account we are “in” the world of both nature and culture simultaneously, and our
understanding of the world, and the particular existents of the world whether they are cultural
(such as artworks and forms of discourse) or natural (such as mountains and chemical processes)
requires us to employ both our joint natural/cultural conceptual resources and our capacity to
reflect on culture’s role in how we acquire, understand and use these resources.

Theoretical Overview and Orientation. The common denominator in Margolis’ work is his
claim that the continually changing and non-teleological collective thinking and active practices
of the culture in which we learn to speak is an ineluctable part of how we understand and
interpret the world, art, history, science and ourselves. He acknowledges that this is a radical
departure from the traditional and popular views in his various arenas of interest, taking time to
demonstrate which metaphysical assumptions and tenets must fall or be revised if his theory is
true. Margolis criticizes Aristotle’s archism, for example, for instituting the idea that
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metaphysical essences must be fixed and unchanging. He also criticizes Kant’s transcendental
method for ignoring both “historicity” (to be defined below under the subheading on History) and
for misconstruing or ignoring the human self (see section on Selves, below). Following these,
Margolis criticizes ideas such as the existence of laws of nature or of a human rationality that
could exist apart from cultural influences, the mind/body dichotomy, idealism without realism,
and the idea that there can be one, determinate interpretation of an artwork that is correct for all
time.

Culture. Culture is the foundational concept upon which the entire body of Margolis’ work is
built. To understand his theory of art, for example, including the nature of an artwork and what
interpretation of an artwork entails, requires understanding that for Margolis culture is agentive,
which means that its actions are what causes it to move, grow, change and develop. Culture
moves the progress of human life and drives history even as culture is constituted by and
constructed by human beings. Margolis’ view of culture is similar, but not identical, to Hegel’s
Geist, Peirce’s cosmic mind (although Margolis has a sense of a human collective rather than
divine mind at work here) and Wittgenstein’s idea of Lebensformen and language games. Culture
is thus a communal, collective, network of practices, behaviors and systems that has been
constructed by thinking selves who have already themselves been constituted by and continue to
be influenced by this culture even as they create and develop it. There is no action or actor, for
Margolis, that is independent of culture. When a person speaks or “utters” something “lingually”
(which for Margolis is not limited to “linguistic” utterances in a formal grammar system but
includes actions such as dancing, making love or baking bread) s/he can only do so because s/he
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has used his or her natural capabilities to learn to make use of the cultural resources available
(such as learning to speak a natural language, read, write, play piano or cook). These “natural
capabilities” upon which a person relies, however, are themselves what they are due to both
biological and cultural evolution, since on Margolis’ view biological evolution develops at a far
slower pace than does cultural evolution, which can change on a moment’s notice, as when a
nation declares war. At no time, however, can biological evolution operate independently of
culture in the human person. For Margolis creatures that are “pre-lingual” are thus merely “protohuman,” by which he means that they are on their way, evolutionarily, to being human persons or
selves. Since culture and selves develop together in non-fixed, non-determined or pre-determined
ways, this creates a view of culture that admits of relativism in the sense that culture is relative to
the practices of the selves that comprise it. Tethering culture to the collective practices and
values of selves and vice-versa should not here be confused with the idea that truth or knowledge
is variable in some way; although it does provide a clue to understanding Margolis’ larger-scale
relativism, which includes the idea that everything we can construe as “true” or “known” in the
world, including that knowledge that we obtain through engagement with natural objects and
phenomena in the physical sciences, is tied to our culturally developed competence to construct,
understand and apply these concepts to the correct referents. Indeed, on Margolis’ account, even
theoretical work in the natural (and not just human) sciences is deeply entrenched in culture; it is
not and can never be “pure” in any way that would suggest any sort of cognitive privilege,
separation or distinction that would make our understanding in this arena somehow “objective.”
Margolis concedes that there are forms of emergence that exist in the natural world that are
entirely reducible materially, such as the chemical processes of thunder or lightning, but he holds
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that as soon as we describe these processes in a treatise on this process we are involved in an
interpretive activity that involves our cultural resources and this makes our theories on these
processes themselves culturally emergent entities (see section on Selves or Persons below for
more on culturally emergent entities). As such scientific theories are on no higher footing, in
terms of their nature as culturally emergent entities, than are theories of art.

Selves or Persons. Margolis holds that without culture we are merely lumps of physical matter,
or biology; we have no thought, we have no agency, we have no context or concepts by which to
communicate, innovate, understand, contemplate, take meaningful actions or live truly human
lives. Thus selves or persons are what Margolis terms culturally emergent entities. We are the
ongoing products or artifacts of culture, or what Margolis sometimes calls “second-natured
selves” following Marjorie Grene (see Grene, “People and Other Animals” in The Understanding
of Nature: Essays in the Philosophy of Biology, Dordrecht: Reidel, 1974, 346-60). We have
emerged from matter in a sui generis way through incremental, biological steps along the
evolutionary chain of development and at the moment that we acquired the capacity for
language, collectively, consensually, through practice, we became “symbiotic” instruments of
culture, making use of physical, natural and cultural resources in pursuit of various goals within
our (now-)meaningful lives. It is in this sense that Margolis in his later works refers to his
philosophical approach as a whole as an attempt to “Darwinize Hegel” (see, for example,
Pragmatism Ascendent, 119-23). In addition, selves necessarily both interpret the world in which
we are placed and are self-interpreting. As such, Margolis sometimes refers to selves as “texts”
since like texts we are open to interpretation and re-interpretation – including interpretation of
5

our capacity to interpret. If we abstract culture away from the self what remains, on Margolis’
view, are just our natural capacities and aptitudes for being cultural agents; that is all biological
“nature” provides. Selves as they exist as culturally emergent entities thus have no fixed
“essences” or “natures” but are instead viewed as ever-changing and developing “careers.” This
also explains why Margolis treats artworks, as culturally emergent entities, as careers rather than
as entities with fixed, particular essences (see sub-headings on the work of art and on
interpretation, below).

The Work of Art. On Margolis’ view a work of art is something that is brought into being by a
human self or person, who is him- or herself a culturally emergent entity in the sense described
earlier. A work of art, like a self, is typically embodied in some material entity or event, which is
not reducible to the physical but that is accessible via our concepts, discernible and real in some
communicative form that is subject to interpretation and reinterpretation by the appreciators of
that artwork. It is that material form that may be classified and individuated as a work of art for
purposes of numerical (which is determinate) rather than for metaphysical (which for Margolis
can never be determinate as to “nature”) identity. Even a conceptual work of art like one of the
red square paintings hypothesized by Arthur Danto in his book The Transfiguration of the
Commonplace are not on Margolis’ view (pace Danto) indiscernibles; meaning that they are not
indistinguishable in perception from the “mere real things” of the non-art world (see The
Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art, Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1981, as well as the entries by Grigoriev and Puolakka on this issue in the bibliography
below). Instead, on Margolis’ view the concept and context of art by which a culturally
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entrenched self accesses a red square painting lies in his or her competence to make an
interpretive judgment as to what the discernible properties of the work refer. If they refer to
something imaginary or real or an artistic idea of some sort that gives the work meaning in any
of the ways that the culture ascribes artistic meaning to works of art (via expressivity,
representation, and the like) then those can be conceived as Intentional properties of the work
with a capital “I” (more on Intentional properties below). In kind, an artwork is no different than
any other inherently interpretable cultural artifact. What makes it “art” rather than a postage
stamp, for example, just lies in the collective practices of the culture by which it is identified.
This means that distinctions can made between the practice of art and the practice of
shipbuilding or of medicine or of chemistry in terms of the typical functions, contents or subject
matter of the practices involved – certain practices of art may aim at expression of emotion, or to
transgress cultural norms in a way that makes the viewer have to contemplate those norms,
whereas work in science may involve understanding the processes by which a gene mutates for
theoretical and/or practical reasons. However, there is no fixed “essence,” function, content or
form that makes an artwork “art” for all time and therefore there is no hard-and-fast line that can
be drawn between works of art and non-art objects. When we engage in discourse about “art,”
then, we are using that term as a façon de parler in order to organize the works we plan to
discuss according their socio-cultural and historical context as entities situated within the cultural
practice of what has been called “art.” We are not identifying a type of object separable from
other culturally emergent entities in any way that goes deeper than the cultural history of this
practice rather than another. Artworks, like human selves, are thus better conceived as “careers”
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rather than “natures,” with the possibility existing that changes in culture can and do change the
Intentional properties, and thus the meaning, of a work of art, including even its status qua art.

Intentional Properties. “Intentional properties” is a term of art that Margolis uses to include and
go beyond both the intentional thought (lower-case “i”) of Edmund Husserl and Franz Brentano
as the content of thought that is directed outwards towards an external referent and the
intensional attributes (with an “s” rather than a “t” following the initial “t”) of meanings that are
definitionally internal and thus non-extensional, as when the meaning of a horse as a quadruped
is applied to the term “horse” (see Margolis, Historied Text, Constructed World, 197-9). In
keeping with the rest of Margolis’ metaphysics of culture, Intentional properties are incarnate in
discernible artworks; the art is existent and “in” the work rather than transparent (this forms the
gist of Margolis’ complaint against Danto and other philosophers of art) and yet they are not
tethered to the materiality of the work and thus can change with new interpretations and
reinterpretations. If the “red” property of a red-square painting for example, were to change in
cultural meaning to no longer signify “communist” but to signify “carnivorous,” for example, the
non-false interpretations of that painting could be expanded to include carnivorousness. Thus the
metaphysics of an artwork, the art-significant part of which resides in its culturally-tethered
Intentional properties, cannot include any fixed “essence” or “nature.” Margolis’ view also allows
for the possibility that the redness of the red-square painting’s meaning, even housed in the same
material painting over time, might lose the meaning of “red-as-communist” altogether if this
meaning goes out of the stable of cultural meanings for “red.” Thus Margolis holds that the
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meaning of an artwork is not, contrary to many theories of art, tied to the intention of the artist,
its provenance, or the cultural meaning of the work at any particular time in history. (For more
on this see the sub-headings on Interpretation and on History, below.)

Intentional Properties are Determinable but Not Determinate. Margolis describes this openended, continually subject-to change feature of the Intentional properties in culturally emergent
entities as “determinable but not determinate,” a phrase that has confounded many a Margolis
scholar. What he means by this phrase is not a Peircean indeterminacy in the sense of
incompleteness that might one day (in the full course of time and evolution) be determinate but
instead that they are only determinable (in the sense of being able to be determined as in
discerned as true at the moment of interpretation in this culturally relative way), via
interpretation, until that time when either the interpretative practices change or the Intentional
properties upon which those interpretations rely change. In this way Margolis rejects Peircean
progressivism and fallibilism, in which knowledge can be made perfect over the course of time,
both in science and as it might apply to art. (For the details of this rejection see The Flux of
History and The Flux of Science, 60-7). Indeed, this is the precise point on which Margolis
disagrees with Michael Krausz on interpretation, which Margolis attributes to Krausz’ tendency
to follow Peircean metaphysics in this way (see Margolis, Selves and Other Texts, 112, 123-5,
127, 129-30). Thus Margolis’ view is that Intentional properties cannot ever be made
“determinate” in any sense that would make them determinate for all time. The “determinable”
part of the phrase exists just to show that interpretations, while they last, can be made and that at
the socio-historical moment at which they are made they can be “true” subject to all the caveats
acknowledging the cultural construction and understanding of the word “true” and on a sense of
9

“true” that means something more like “apt” than a sense of the word “true” that requires a fixed
referent.

Interpretation. Margolis holds that interpretation can change artworks; an artwork’s identity is
neither limited to the efforts or intentions of the artist nor to any one assessment of the work.
Interpretations do not just identify Intentional properties but can constitute them and even change
them even if the material artwork remains identical as to its natural properties. This is because
the “reality” of the cultural world to which Intentional properties belong is continually
constructed and reconstructued by human selves who are themselves encultured. Margolis’
theory of interpretation has led some philosophers to worry that it is logically incoherent (see
Davies, Krausz and Shusterman, and Stecker entries in the bibliography below). In general the
concern is that Margolis’ sense of what is “true” in interpretation, which as explained before
means something more like “apt” in a culturally-relative way because it applies to determinable
rather than determinate properties, provides a relativistic truth that diminishes “true” to “true-forx.” Margolis denies that his eschewing of bivalent truth values for interpretation of culturally
emergent entities leads to any inconsistency once one understands that on a multi-valued logic
one can have inconsistent interpretations of an artwork that are true in the sense of apt,
reasonable, or probable without one of them being false, which can happen in the case of one
artwork sustaining different meanings when understood relative to culture (but not relative to
truth).
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History and Historicity. Margolis’ view on history and “historicity,” which he defines as “the
notion that thought and the forms of human existence are themselves the changing artifacts of
changing history” (Margolis, Historied Thought, Constructed World, 7) is best understood in
light of his radicalized, pragmatic metaphysics and his theory of the primacy of culture. For
Margolis history is both constituted by and itself constitutes human thought. It thus unfolds and
changes and develops in conjunction with collective trends in human thought. Like the human
self, and like thought (which for Margolis exists in the collective practices of human culture),
history thus has no fixed, essential structure and historical time is not identical to physical time.
Further, there can be no getting history “right” for all time through any particular narrative,
although such narratives are real and not fictional, just as there can be no single, correct
interpretation of any other culturally emergent entity that can remain true for all time. It is on
these grounds that Margolis criticizes “traditionalist” and “progressivist” theories of history (and
science), which hold that there are either invariant laws of or guiding history or certain “truths”
about human nature or reason that can be recovered from within variability. (For more on this
see The Flux of History and The Flux of Science.)
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